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ABSTRACT Deleuze and Guattari, as strict immanentists and consistent proponents of an
“in-the-middle” or “in-between,” had little philosophical time for notions of “the outside” or
“the beyond” construed in terms invoking traditional ideas of transcendence (even though
they created their own absolutely original notion of an “immanent transcendence.” Any such
“in-the-middle,” however, must presuppose a milieu that is outside that “in-the-middle,” albeit
one constituting a surround or ‘interzone’ (a term borrowed from William Burroughs’ novel
Naked Lunch) for the “in-the-middle” in question, even if this surrounding milieu or inter-
zone will, like its contiguous “in-the-middle,” also be unequivocally immanent. The essay dis-
cusses the kind of conceptual assemblage pertaining to interality/interology that can be
constructed with regard to Deleuzo-Guattarian “surroundings.”
KEYWORDS Deleuze; Guattari; In-the-middle
RÉSUMÉ  Deleuze et Guattari, comme immanentistes strictes et promoteurs loyaux d’un
« au-milieu » ou « entre-deux », avait peu de patience philosophique pour les notions d’un
« extérieur » ou d’un « au-delà » interprétées en termes invoquant les idées traditionnelles de
la transcendance (bien qu’ils aient créé leur propre notion absolument originale d’une
« transcendance immanente »). Un tel « au-milieu », cependant, suppose un milieu qui est à
l’extérieur de l’« au-milieu », quoique constituant des environs ou une « interzone » (mes
excuses ici à William Burroughs d’avoir volé ce dernier terme de son roman Naked Lunch)
pour l’«au-milieu» en question, même si ce milieu environnant ou cette interzone, comme son
« au-milieu » contiguë, sera également et sans équivoque immanent. L’essai traite de l’espèce
d’agencement conceptuel concernant l’interalité / l’interologie qui pourrait être construit à
l’égard des « environs » deleuzoguattariens. 
MOTS CLÉS  Delueze; Guattari; Entre 
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, as strict immanentists and consistent proponents of
an “in-the-middle” or “in-between,” had little philosophical time for notions of “the
outside” or “the beyond’ construed in terms invoking traditional ideas of transcen-
dence (even though they created their own absolutely original notion of an “immanent
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transcendence,” about which more will be said later. Any such “in-the-middle,” how-
ever, must presuppose a milieu that is outside that “in-the-middle,” albeit one consti-
tuting a surround or “interzone” (half-hearted apologies here to William Burroughs
for my theft of the latter term from his novel Naked Lunch) for the “in-the-middle” in
question, even if this surrounding milieu or interzone will, like its contiguous “in-the-
middle,” also be unequivocally immanent. So what can be said about this Deleuzo-
Guattarian surround or interzone? Insights into this topic are present throughout the
œuvres of Deleuze and Guattari, so let us try to see what kind of conceptual assemblage
can be constructed with regard to Deleuzo-Guattarian “surroundings.”
Two difﬁculties face any attempt to delineate this Deleuzo-Guattarian
surround(ing) or interzone. The ﬁrst is the realization that Deleuze himself makes a
number of signiﬁcant distinctions between terms that seemingly convey the same
meaning in everyday usage, namely, the outside, the exterior, and the forms of exteriority.
To quote Deleuze (1986):
We must even distinguish between several correlative agencies, of which
there are at least three. There is ﬁrst of all the outside which exists as an
unformed element of forces: the latter come from and remain attached to
the outside, which stirs up their relations and draws out their diagrams.
And then there is the exterior as the area of concrete assemblages, where
relations between forces are realized. And lastly there are the forms of ex-
teriority, since the realization takes place in a split or disjunction between
two different forms that are exterior to one another and yet share the same
assemblages (the conﬁnements and interiorizations being only transitory
ﬁgures on the surface of these forms). (p.  43, emphasis in original)
The second difﬁculty is the several different Deleuzo-Guattarian angles from which
one can attempt this theorization of the surround(ing) or interzone—these concepts
are at work, whether implicitly or overtly, in any number of their key formulations, in-
volving such terms as “assemblage” (components of any assemblage always being more
or less adjacent to each other), “multiplicity” (if there are many, then how do they sur-
round, or not surround each other?), “the fold/folding” (folding “in” always presup-
poses a surrounding “outside” from which the inward folding proceeds), “the rhizome”
(rhizomatic roots always exist in an unstructured proliferation existing in relations of
distance and nearness to each other, thereby posing the question of their milieu), “the
line of ﬂight” (a ﬂight from where, and to where?), “the  event” (events are unavoidably
positioned within or next to other events, as when the event “the battle of the Somme”
is itself a constituent of the bigger event “the First World War”), and so forth.
Also relevant here is Deleuze’s proposition, which he attributed to Foucault even
though it was as much his own, that philosophical universals or substantives are best
understood if their noun-forms are turned into verb-forms, exhibiting in the process
the outlines of the practices that are the basis of their respective conceptual operations
or functions. Hence, the putatively universal concept “the  general” is to be resolved
into the practices of generalization; “the  plural” into those of pluralization; “the  indi-
vidual” into those of individuation; “the  universal” into those of universalization;
“the  multiple” into those of multiplication; “the  singular” into those of singularization;
and so  on. It follows from this that if we are to speak in a Deleuzo-Guattarian way of
“the  surround” or the “interzone,” then adhering to this strategic proposition adjures
us philosophically to transmute these notions into their enabling and subtending prac-
tices of surrounding or interzoning. Bearing in mind of course that any practice under-
lying these notions of “surrounding” will itself be surrounded by the three agencies
mentioned above by Deleuze (the outside, the exterior, and the forms of exteriority)—
indeed, with Deleuze and Guattari one is perforce dealing at all times with nothing
less than a conceptual architectonic even when examining the most material and con-
crete of entities, an architectonic whose elements will have to be acknowledged when
registering the force and saliency of one or the other components of this comprehen-
sive conceptual ediﬁce.
As indicated, there are many potential entry-ways into a Deleuzo-Guattarian con-
ceptualization of “the surround” or the “interzone.” For now, let us attempt to see how
this conceptualization works with regard to the notion of an “assemblage.” An assem-
blage for Deleuze and Guattari is an assorted ensemble of bodies, entities, properties,
territories, and expressions that are assembled together in a particular conﬁguration
at a speciﬁc place and time. The assemblage comes about through the coalescence of
forces that give the assemblage in question its function and that form the connections
between heterogeneous elements enabling its emergence as that particular assemblage.
In addition to these forces that enable connections within assemblages, other forces
will facilitate connections between assemblages, even those of the most disparate kind.
Unless blocked, the “raison” of an assemblage is an ongoing innovation and produc-
tion—impelled by a ceaseless desiring-production, this will involve the production of
new kinds of expression, new ways of living and learning, novel forms of territorial
and spatial expansion or contraction, new societies and organizations, and so forth.
Interestingly enough, it was Guattari perhaps more than Deleuze who gnawed
away for years at the “problematic” of the comprehensive ﬁeld or milieu that allowed
the different interrelating zones of this desiring-production to emerge, even though
both thinkers were deeply concerned with re-conceptualizations of subjectivity that
would avoid the perceived reductionism of structuralism and phenomenology.1
In his practice at the La Borde clinic, Guattari was working with schizophrenic pa-
tients who were often in states of extreme catatonic withdrawal, lacking the intact sub-
jectivities and egos of the typical neurotic individual of psychoanalytic theory. The
schizophrenics Guattari encountered at La  Borde, in contrast to Freud’s neurotic pa-
tients, possessed mere slivers of subjectivity and shattered ego-fragments that made
any kind of focused speech and behaviour difﬁcult, if not impossible. Hence the task
of Guattari and his fellow staff-members at the clinic was to create workable “trans-
versalities” between these different slivers and fragments, creating connectivities be-
tween them that would at least be resilient enough to enable a patient to begin to
negotiate their everyday world. The Freudian “talking cure” was simply unobtainable
as a resource for the kinds of patients who came to La  Borde, with subjectivities typi-
cally too split and disjointed to provide them with linguistic and behavioural “recep-
tors” stable or adequate enough for feasible participation in a Freudian talking cure.
Often considerable ingenuity on the part of the therapist was required to help construct
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transversalities that could beneﬁt patients going through a severe and protracted crisis,
a case in point here being the following episode involving the Scottish pioneer of an-
tipsychiatry, R.D. Laing, with whom Guattari had a fraught acquaintanceship and a
number of intellectual disagreements, helpfully documented by Dosse (2010) (some
important commonalities of interest notwithstanding):
In Chicago, Laing was invited by some doctors to examine a young girl di-
agnosed as schizophrenic. The girl was locked into a padded cell in a spe-
cial hospital and sat there naked. She usually spent the whole day rocking
to and fro. The doctors asked Laing for his opinion … Unexpectedly, Laing
stripped off naked himself and entered her cell. There he sat with her, rock-
ing in time to her rhythm. After about 20  minutes she started speaking,
something she had not done for several months. The doctors were amazed.
“Did it never occur to you to do that?” Laing commented … (Clay, 1997, as
quoted by Austin, last para.)
The milieu in which this novel transversality between Laing and the severely cata-
tonic patient was created consists of very disparate entities that had to be assembled
according to a multivalent logic or logics—bodies (both naked and clothed, indeed
one can assume that the catatonic young girl’s doctors at the hospital were wearing
the ofﬁcially prescribed white coats), bodily movements (rocking in this case), hospital
rooms (such as the padded cell) and buildings, voices and everyday speech, facial ex-
pressions, the discourses of psychiatry, medical routines and practices, and so on. At
La  Borde, Guattari and his associates would have been constructing transversalities
and their accompanying assemblages on a similarly large scale, albeit without the em-
blematic white coats and the discourses of a full-blown psychiatric practice.2
When it came to providing cartographies (an undertaking Guattari called “meta-
modelization”) of these complex formations he called “ecosophic objects,” Guattari’s
preference was for a non-mathematical and non-representational logic based on the
quadrant rather than the binary or triad.3 The ecosophic object is constituted on the
basis of four functors (“functor/foncteur” being a term in mathematics designating
the mapping between categories): 1)  material, energetic, and semiotic ﬂuxes; 2)  con-
crete and abstract machinic phylums; 3)  virtual universes of value; and 4)  ﬁnite exis-
tential territories (Guattari, 1995). 
Janell Watson provides a grid (see Figure 1) of Guattari’s four functors or functives
(2009, p.  100). Guattari also makes it clear that by resorting to the notion of a functor
or functives he is seeking an alternative to the paradigms or conceptual templates es-
poused by Freudians, Saussureans, and Marxists:
To speak of machines rather than drives, Fluxes rather than libido, exis-
tential Territories rather than the instances of the self and of transference,
incorporeal Universes rather than unconscious complexes and sublima-
tion, chaosmic entities rather than signiﬁers—ﬁtting ontological dimen-
sions together in a circular manner rather than dividing the world up into
infrastructure and superstructure—may not simply be a  matter of vocab-
ulary! (Guattari, 1995, p.  126)
Of these four functors, ﬂuxes or ﬂows are perhaps most familiar to the readers of
Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987). Fluxes or ﬂows,
redolent with all the broadly angled connotations of ﬂuidity or liquidity, were chosen
by Deleuze and Guattari as a direct counter to the ostensible rigidities of an explicit or
implicit structuralism. Flows can of course encompass a wide and incongruous-seem-
ing range of phenomena. In Anti-Oedipus and A Thousand Plateaus, ﬂows and ﬂuxes
incorporate matter, energy, words and their myriad and sometimes almost impossible
to attain meanings (Joyce’s Finnegan’s Wake was a particular favourite of Guattari’s),
desire, libido, commodities, weapons, metals, capital; and they have conceptual afﬁl-
iations with nomads, deterritorializations, machines, and smooth space (see Watson,
2013). In the context of our discussion, R.D.  Laing’s decisive creation of a transversality
in the case of the catatonic patient would amount to the unclogging of an energetic
ﬂow of speech that had been blocked as a result of her catatonic condition.
Guattari’s second functor—concrete and machinic phylums—derives from the
insight that evolutionary mutation operates not only in the realm of organic matter,
but also encompasses machinic implements and technologies. There are animal phyla,
but also machinic phyla:
We may speak of a machinic phylum, or technological Iineage, wherever
we ﬁnd a constellation of singularities, prolongable by certain operations,
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Figure 1
Source: Watson (1995)
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which converge, and make the operations converge, upon one or several
assignable traits of expression (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987, p.  406).
Or again in A Thousand Plateaus, where these phyla are said to be “matter in
movement”:
We always get back to this deﬁnition: the machinic phylum is materiality,
natural or artiﬁcial, and both simultaneously; it is matter in movement,
in ﬂux, in variation, matter as a conveyor of singularities and traits of ex-
pression. (pp.  409)
…  Unformed matter, the phylum, is not dead, brute, homogeneous matter,
but a matter-movement bearing singularities or haecceities, qualities, and
even operations (itinerant technological lineages). (pp. 512)
As a functor, the machinic phyla share the property of discursivity with their cor-
relative functor, the energetic ﬂows. Our subjectivities are plugged into the machinic
phyla and vice versa, so that they function as our technological prostheses. Hence, in
the context of our discussion, an electro-shock machine, as it alters the subjective dis-
positions of a patient, would be a component in the machinic phylum into which the
La  Borde clinic is inserted.
The third functor—virtual incorporeal universes of value—designates the shared
aspects of subjectivity that come to exist only when they are embodied in the fourth
function, the existential territories:
[I]n a certain fashion, all modelling systems are valid, all are acceptable,
in my opinion. This is solely to the extent that their principles of intelligi-
bility give up any universalist pretention [sic] and admit that they have no
other mission than to contribute to the cartography of existential
Territories, implying sensible, cognitive, affective, aesthetic, etc. Universes,
for clearly delimited areas and periods of time. (Guattari, 2013, p.  3)
As the name implies, virtual incorporeal universes are crystallizations of values
or symbolic and cultural references characteristic of a particular epoch or social assem-
blage. Hence the therapeutic values espoused at La  Borde are those speciﬁc to mid- to
late-twentieth-century western Europe and North America—at an earlier time a schiz-
ophrenic would have been ministered to by a priest or monk, or in a non-Western mi-
lieu, even today, by a shaman or medicine man or woman.
The fourth function—the existential territories—within which the universes of
value are embodied, refers to the lived experience of the body, self, family, a “native”
tongue, race, and ethnicity:
The objects of art and desire are apprehended within existential Territories
which are at the same time the body proper, the self, the maternal body,
lived space, refrains of the mother tongue, familiar faces, family lore, eth-
nicity. (Guattari, 1995, p.  95)
Or as Guattari says elsewhere about our lives as individuated beings:
We must start from a multivalent logic, and accept the notion of identity
which I call existential territory, because we cannot live outside our bodies,
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our friends, some sort of human cluster, and at the same time, we are burst-
ing out of this situation. (Guattari, 1996, p.  216)
This then is the ontology of Deleuze and Guattari (or at any rate, it is one way of
framing it, there of course being other, alternative framings for this ontology). Our
lives, whether as individuals or as social beings (the two of course being inextricably
bound together), are inserted in a vast and complex web whose ecosophic cartography
is rendered by the application of these four functions or functives. In this gigantic web,
countless bodies are surrounded by groups, groups are surrounded by their milieu,
the myriad milieux surrounded by their universes.
No one component in this web is isolated from the other; everything surrounds,
and is surrounded by, everything else. All things coexist and interact in an immense,
pullulating chaosmos, a chaosmos marked by an irreducible heterogenesis in which a
potentially inﬁnite number of singularities (with their associated subjectivities) are
created out of energy-desire, die out when voided of energy-desire, become merged
with other singularities when energy-desire takes a different course, and so on, and so
on, until … 4
So how do Deleuze and Guattari advance the paradigms known as “interality”
and “interology?” The obvious instance of interality in this article is the episode in-
volving the catatonic girl, when the maverick psychiatrist Laing, by resorting to what
would typically be regarded as a breach of medical ethics (a doctor getting naked in
front of a patient!), was able to unblock a communicative impasse that conventional
psychiatry had been unable to resolve (and may even have reinforced). Deleuze and
Guattari contribute to the study of interology by providing us with an extensive con-
ceptual armature for characterizing and analyzing the myriad processes of interality.
This armature includes the following concepts: constructivism, fabulation, creative
transformation, nomadicism, multiplicity, differentiation/differenciation, synthesis,
deterritorialization/reterritorialization, milieu, process, body without organs, lines of
ﬂight, foldings, rhizome, assemblage, capture, chaos, becomings, emergence, move-
ment, virtuality, attractors, intercessors, active/reactive, affect, transversality, ecosophy,
and so on. The outcome is a monumental architectonic for the organization of the
myriad ﬁelds of experience and thought, these ﬁelds being the domain in which inter-
ality plays itself out, and which interology has as its object.
Notes
This much is clear from the hugely informative biography of Deleuze and Guattari by François Dosse1.
(2010), Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari. Dosse, despite some factual inaccuracies, throws much light
on the complexities and ramiﬁcations of their intellectual collaboration, with Guattari “the inveterate
autodidact” (in his own words) producing “rough diamonds” at the seemingly manic rate of “three
ideas a minute” that the more measured Deleuze, who also had a more traditional academic pedigree,
“polished” into philosophical prose. Guattari always found writing difﬁcult, despite his prodigious in-
tellect, and preferred to express his ideas—maybe “models” is the more accurate term—in diagram
after diagram. Dosse notes that Guattari was sometimes unhappy with the way Deleuzean prose con-
veyed, or rather ﬂattened-out in the eyes of Guattari, the latter’s diagrammed models.
As was to be expected, two issues were recurrent points of contention and negotiation for those2.
who ran La  Borde: how deregulated was it to be as an institution for those severely challenged when
it came to a modicum of everyday functioning and the role of medication in the treatment of patients
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who were often unresponsive to conventional therapies and medical regimens. Dosse (2010) provides
a wealth of detail on this. He shows that Guattari was generally in favour both of regulation (e.g., he
would insist that patients get out of bed and adhere to a daily timetable) and of the use of medication
(frowned-upon by the anti-psychiatrists on the grounds that establishment psychiatrists basically med-
icated their patients not to help them, but to smooth-over their own inadequacies as medical practi-
tioners—hence Guattari’s disagreement with anti-psychiatrists such as Laing who were antipathetic
to medicating patients). A form of social or group psychotherapy was the institutional norm at
La  Borde, but within this broad ambit “orthodox” psychiatric interventions were permitted (such as
electro-shock therapy, often requested by those patients dealing with debilitating anxieties that could
not be calmed down by any other means). Dosse indicates that Guattari was fairly comfortable with
the terms of this set-up. (Incidentally, Dosse also says that Deleuze was uncomfortable being around
those who were mentally broken-down, and he avoided La  Borde for this reason.)
To quote Guattari on his preference for the quadrant when it comes to metamodelling: “[T]he cat-3.
egories of metamodelization proposed here  … are  … of interest because they come in fours and allow
us to break free of tertiary descriptions which always end up falling back into dualisms” (Guattari,
1995, p.  31).
I am grateful to Janell Watson for help in the construction of my argument. Any errors are of course4.
mine alone.
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